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SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 44

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From Moscow

EXTERNAL - POLITICAL

1. Party Congress and Soviet Foreign Relations: CPSU Congress proceedings filled almost all available space in the Soviet newspapers. The few columns left for developments abroad were mainly devoted to reports of favorable foreign reactions to the congress, both within and outside the bloc. A Soviet newspaper reader would get the impression that the entire world was remaining in suspense, waiting until the congress ends before resuming normal activity. Notable omissions in the Soviet press were any idea of the extent of foreign resentment over the explosion of the 50 megaton bomb, and the tense situation in Berlin revolving around Western access to the Eastern Sector. The only major development about which the Soviet public was given some important bits of information was the brewing trouble between the USSR and Communist China.

2. Intra-Bloc Cleavage. In his third known speech to the party congress on October 27, Khrushchev expanded the attacks on Albania made by other Soviet and foreign communist leaders and called for the removal of the two top Albanian leaders from power. This represents the most naked assertion of Soviet authority over the world communist movement since Moscow tried to overthrow the Yugoslav leadership in 1948. In this speech Khrushchev brought the Chinese Communists into the Albanian picture by stating that the Chinese Communist Party was in the best position to get the Albanians to return to the path of bloc unity. He also refuted Mao Tse-tung's "paper tiger" thesis, without, however, mentioning Mao or posing the issue as a Soviet-Chinese difference on the role of war in expanding communism.

The Chinese Communist delegation to the party congress left for Peiping on October 31, demonstratively avoiding a reception given by the newly-elected CPSU Central Committee for foreign communist party delegates on November 1. The Soviet press reported that the Chicom newspapers had published the full text of Khrushchev's October 27 speech and the October 28 congress resolution concerning the removal of Stalin's corpse from the Lenin Mausoleum. But the Soviet press did not mention the fact that the Albanian Communist Party had issued a statement on October 20 personally attacking Khrushchev and the CPSU leadership and that this statement had been published in Chinese Communist newspapers together with Khrushchev's speech and other congress material against the Albanians.

3. Berlin. [redacted]

Soviet statements during the Party Congress continued to reiterate the standard Soviet proposal for signature of a German peace treaty and normalization of situation in West Berlin "on that basis." The final resolution of the congress in referring to the Soviet proposal did not, however, include the phrase "on that basis."

Von Bretano's resignation was noted in several press commentaries. Pravda reported the development in such a way as to suggest Bonn may eventually adopt more flexible policies as a result of FDP influence in any new government.

4. Soviets Invoke 1948 Treaty With Finland. USSR in a note to Finland on Oct. 30 invoked the 1948 Soviet-Finnish treaty and called for consultation between the two governments in view of the alleged threat to Soviet security posed by West Germany. Moscow apparently calculated that the sudden invocation of the treaty would serve to generate fear abroad over the possibility of war arising from the Berlin crisis. At the same time, the USSR appeared to hope that its action would lead to divisive pressure on the Scandinavian governments.

5. Nkrumah Appeal on Testing. On October 27, Pravda published the text of an appeal made by Nkrumah to the Soviets against the further testing of nuclear weapons, with special reference to the 50 megaton bomb, and Khrushchev's response. These documents gave the Soviet public some hint at least of the uneasiness existing abroad over Soviet atmospheric testing. In his response, Khrushchev said the NATO actions were responsible for the Soviet testing program and contended that the West was seeking to convince the Soviet Union that a thermo-nuclear war would be unleashed in the event the Soviet Union signed a German peace treaty. Humanitarian considerations involved in the Nkrumah appeal were completely side-stepped. Similar messages, the Soviets said, were sent to Prime Minister Ikeda, Emperor Haile Selassie, a group of British Laborites and American scientist L. Pauling.

6. Nuclear Testing. The Soviet press has continued its total silence on details of various Soviet atmospheric tests. On the day following the detonation of its largest test thus far, the Soviet press carried a squib indicating that the United States had conducted another underground nuclear explosion. Although Western newsmen reported that Khrushchev had referred to the detonation of a nuclear bomb in the 50 megaton range in his October 27 Party Congress speech, the text of the address as published in the Soviet press the next day made no mention of such comments.

7. Soviet-Turkish Relations. On the occasion of the Turkish national holiday, Izvestiya published a commentary stressing that the Soviet Union was doing its best to improve relations with Turkey. In an implicit compliment to Gursel, the article cited several factors which reflected that changes for the better in Soviet-Turkish relations had taken place since the overthrow of the Menderes Government. At the same time, however, an article in a weekly news pagazine was critical of the Committee of National Unity, headed by Gursel, for not carrying through with internal economic and social reforms.

Comment: The cautious, optimistic approach expressed in Izvestiya mirrors the continuing efforts of the Soviets to cultivate the Turks in the hope that their ties with NATO and CENTO might be weakened.

8. SUDAN. Ibahim Mustaf, a member of the Central Committee of the Sudanese Communist Party, told the Soviet Communist Party Congress that his party was carrying out a policy of unifying all national forces into a united front and that a series of strikes and demonstration for fundamental rights were being carried out in the Sudan. Mustaf emphasized that the Soviet Communist Party Program was a source of strength in the Sudanese Communist Party's struggle to create a government of national democracy and to liberate the economy of the Sudan from the influence of imperialist monopolies. In his address, Mustaf did not openly attack President Abboud, presumably in deference to the Soviets who are courting him with offers of technical aid and assistance.

INTERNAL - POLITICAL

9. XXII CPSU Congress Concludes. The most sensational development of this past week's Party Congress activities was the publication on October 29 of Khrushchev's speech of October 27, in which he surfaced significant portions of his "Secret Speech" to the XX Congress in 1956 and attempted to lay the ghost of Stalin once and for all. Having heard the speech, the Congress adopted a resolution to remove Stalin's body from the Stalin Mausoleum "to another place" -- as it developed, to a grave behind the mausoleum near the Kremlin wall. This development evoked more public excitement and open discussion among Soviet citizens than had been seen here in a long time. Older people appeared to be generally in favor of the move; younger people were confused. It was reliably reported that students at Moscow University had begun to march into the center of the city with the intention of pulling Stalin's body out of the tomb. The militia turned the crowd back, however, and the Komsomol organized a meeting at which the students were able to blow off steam by adopting a resolution supporting the decision of the Congress to remove the body.

Khrushchev suggested the erection of a monument to the victims of Stalinism, but no action appears to have been taken so far on this proposal.

On October 29, Khrushchev dedicated a statue of Karl MARX on Sverdlov Square, opposite the Bolshoi Theatre. Like the heavy emphasis laid on Lenin and Leninism at the Congress, this action may have been designed, in part, at least, to off-set the shock produced by the new stage in the de-Stalinization campaign.

In his October 29 speech, Khrushchev also pardoned VOROSHILOV, whose restrained mea culpa, contained in a letter he sent the Congress on October 26, was apparently accepted by the leadership -- at least, for the time being -- as sufficient atonement for his alleged political sins and crimes.

The action taken by the Congress towards the "anti-Party group" was indecisive. After the earlier demands of many speakers that the members of the group -- and especially MOLOTOV, MALENKOV, and KAGANOVICH -- "answer to the Party and the people" both for their political mistakes and for their criminal actions in organizing "mass repressions" of Party and non-Party people, the Congress resolution treated the whole question as essentially a political one, which was now over and done with. It is not yet clear whether the "anti-Party group" will be excluded from the Party, although this would appear to be the minimum punishment that they should receive. If this is later done, the contradiction between the specific criminal accusations made against members of the "group" and failure to let justice take its course would still remain.

The new Central Committee "elected" by the Congress is expanded by 42 new members and 33 new candidates, by comparison with its immediate predecessor. It includes all the important Party and Government leaders of the Soviet Union, and the entire top leadership of the Ministry of Defense is now among its full members, with the exception of one Deputy Minister of Marshal's rank, ROKOSSOVSKIY, who is a candidate member.

The new Central Committee held its first plenum immediately after its election at the Congress' afternoon session on October 31. (Indeed, the termination of the Congress on October 31 appears to have taken even Pravda by surprise. Its November 1 television schedule provided for the showing of the "Congress Diary" at 10:30 that evening. Instead, the late evening news program appeared at 10:30 p.m., its normal spot.) The new Central Committee organs are characterized by a reversion of the Presidium to its pre-1956 size of eleven members, and an enlargement of the Secretariat from five to nine. Frol R. Kozlov is confirmed as second only to Khrushchev by his listing, out of alphabetical order, ahead of the other secretaries.

10. The New Program of the CPSU. The Third Program of the CPSU was adopted unanimously on October 31, the closing day of the XXII Congress. Just four days earlier, a Commission headed by Khrushchev had been appointed to consider amendments and additions to the Program suggested during the "debate" at the Congress. These included few additions of domestic-political significance. For example, in Section VII, which is concerned with the "renewal" of, and elections to, Party organs (WEEKA NO. 31, August 4), only a few words were changed.

"The highest principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat is the firm alliance of the working class and the toiling masses of the peasantry under the leadership of the working class," a formulation omitted from the 1961 October Revolution slogans (WEEKA NO. 42, October 20), has now been included in Part I, Section 1, of the Program as adopted by the Congress. The question of the dictatorship of the proletariat had been the subject of discussion in the Soviet press between the publication of the draft Program at the end of July and the opening of the Congress. An article in the Party theoretical journal Kommunist (No. 13) in September defended the proposition that, once "socialism" had been built, the dictatorship of the proletariat was no longer necessary. Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist press was arguing

that the significance of the dictatorship of the proletariat had not grown less. The Third Program's inclusion of this formulation seems to indicate a recognition by the Soviet Party leadership that it is inexpedient to drop it at this time.

The collective-farm peasantry has been given some reassurance by an addition to Part II(a) of the Program which says that "kolkhoz trade will also preserve its significance" (i.e., the free market, a major source of peasant income, will not be abolished.)

Minor recognition also has been given to workers reluctant to wait another 10-20 years for rising living standards. Part II(b) now contains the promise that, by the end of the first, instead of the second, 10-year period, an end would be put to deficient housing, and persons still living in bad and sub-standard housing would receive new quarters. Others, even if they have children, still have to wait until the end of the second 20-year period for "well-built quarters conforming to the needs of hygenic and cultural existence." For these families, however, it is added that "the Party considers it necessary to do everything possible during the next few years" to fully satisfy the demand for pre-school institutions.

With regard to national preparedness, the Program retains all earlier patriotic formulations regarding the necessity of defending "socialism", and adds a sentence to Part III, Section 3, stating that "the Party will comprehensively facilitate the further development of the activities/public defense organizations." Whether these organizations have a para-military or civil-defense character, is not made clear.

Finally, the following sentence has been added to the Program: "Under contemporary conditions, in a number of capitalist countries, the working class headed by its avant-garde is able, on the basis of workers' and popular fronts and other possible forms of agreement and political cooperation with various parties and public organizations, to unite the majority of the people, to win state power without civil war, and to assure the transfer of the basic means of production to the hands of the people."

11. Party By-Laws Approved Virtually Without Change. With the exception of two added sentences, all changes made in the draft By-Laws of the CPSU, as finally adopted at the XXII Congress on October 31, consist of minor emendations involving word substitutions or style.

The following sentence has been added to Section 2 (which outlines the obligations of Party membership): "/A member of the party is obligated/ (k) to assist the strengthening of the defensive capacity of the USSR in every way possible, to conduct a ceaseless struggle for peace and friendship, among peoples."

Less substantively, a sentence has been added to Section 70 to permit finer gradation of dues assessments. There is now an assessment of only 2% of the monthly income of Party members earning between 201-250 rubles. The draft provided for only one 201-300 ruble bracket assessed 2.5%.

12. Political Control of the Army Re-Affirmed. On October 23, Defense Minister R. Ya. MALINOVSKIY told the XXII CPSU Congress that nearly 90% of all officers of the armed forces and 82% of all ranks were Communists or Komsomols. On October 28, at the Congress, Golikov added that, since January 1, 1958 (Marshal ZHUKOV had been ousted in October, 1957, on a charge of obstructing Party work in the Armed Forces), the number of Party organizations or groups at the battalion and division level had doubled and organizations at the company level had grown from 40% to 93%.

The Party By-Laws adopted by the Congress on October 31 state: "... the direction of Party work in the armed forces is accomplished by the Central Committee through the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, functioning with the rights of a Section of the Central Committee of the CPSU."

MILITARY (ARMY)

13. [redacted]

For the Ambassador:

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